Brexit is an abbreviation used to mean the exit of Britain from the European Union. The decision of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union has triggered many challenges to the economy and the stability of the nation. Many government officials are still hopeful that the United Kingdom will negotiate trade agreements with the European Union even after the exit. Norway is a perfect example of this trade deal, which it enjoys with the European Union (EU) (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). In this precept, this paper will analyze why the United Kingdom must negotiate agreements such as those related to trade, which is presently enjoyed by Norway.
The most obvious reason why the United kingdom must sign an agreement with the EU is that it would ensure a smooth way for the United Kingdom to retain or rather maintain the EU’s market as it has voted to leave the bloc. However, in the EEA’s largest number, the questions directed towards Norway pertains to the merits of approving the neighboring country into the accord (Weiler, 2016). The accord has been tailored majorly to the necessities of the country and its other Scandinavian blocs; Liechtenstein and Iceland. This has triggered many questions from the finance and the prime minister and other leaders of the Labor Party, which forms the largest group in the opposition party (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016).
It is apparent that the process of signing up to the EEA will make it easier for the United Kingdom to keep the internal ties by staying within the trade boundaries, which are the basis of prosperity. Despite the need of adherence to much of the EU laws; freedom of people, there will also be a provision from the bureaucracy of Brussels, which has undergone vilification by the proponents of the Brexit. Norwegian industry minister Monica Maeland reiterated that it would be far from a clear case that the Norwegian republic would obviously welcome the United Kingdom into the border trade cooperation (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016).
Now that the United Kingdom has formally exited the EU through casting votes, it must clarify its position. After this has been communicated, the EU should then decide how they would work with that through deciding on their positions. This apparently explains why it is still too early to talk about a possible expansion of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Weiler, 2016).
The position of the United Kingdom is still evident as of the moment since the stepping down of the prime minister and the court saga regarding the manner in which the implementation process was to be carried out. However, during the referendum campaigns, the position of Norway was rendered unpalatable by many votes to leave proponents because it never stopped the movement of people from one place to the other. Additionally, this would only bound the country to the EU without any significant influence in the EU.
In an apparent move to strengthen the country’s stability and economy, Norway has consequently adopted about 75% of the European’s Laws but has little say regarding what the laws entail. Norway’s also pays the EU about $717 million a year for allowing access to the internal marketing system (Weiler, 2016). According to the experts, an entry of the United Kingdom would challenge the traded balance and that of the agreement, which does not cover the European Unions’ fisheries and agriculture policies. It is believed that the UK would need some amendments that would favor them and thereby apply their clout to sail them through (Dagnis & Snaith, 2016).
According to Gahr Stoere who is the Labor party leader in Norway, there would be a high probability of the United Kingdom finding an in-depth market system in the EU due to its leaving the EU. In this regard, Mr. Gahr reiterated that it would be the obligation of Norway to ensure the integrity and the stability of the EEA. Norway will be more than unlikely to alter the trade agreement that has lasted for more than two decades. Norway understands that the UK needs to enter into a trade agreement with the EU to ensure the stability of its economy now that it exited the bloc (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016). Therefore, the country hopes that it would instead hold a meeting with the UK’s officials in a parallel meeting regarding the EU trade ties.
The agreement that concerns the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) highlights on the foreign direct investment and the external trade matters. The policy is commonly referred to as the CCP to the European bloc. According to the article 3(1) (e) in the TFEU guidelines, there is an expression, which stipulates CCP falls within the EU domain. The sole objective of the policy is to block all member states from jeopardizing the trade policy of EU (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). If there were different tariff deals, the functionality of the customs union would be invariably affected. This implies that the European Union has the jurisdiction to renegotiate and also conclude all trade agreements with third party countries. In this case, the United Kingdom would have been prevented from entering trade deals with the EU had it not separated itself from the bloc (Dagnis & Snaith, 2016).
However, the case at hand is that the UK had triggered article 50 of the TFEU’s guidelines by voting to leave the EU. It is apparent that the same article would authorize the United Kingdom to negotiate its trade agreements with the EU (Dagnis & Snaith, 2016). The treaty with the EU ceased to function moments after the UK voted to leave the EU. However, the treaty may still apply if the UK and the European Council unanimously votes or rather agrees to extend the period. Therefore, it is apparent under Article 50(3) the UK just like Norway is free to discuss trade agreements with the EU for it had already withdrawn from the EU.
While it is apparent under the jurisdiction of the EU guidelines that the United Kingdom cannot decide on any trade deal with any third party while still a member of the EU, there is no any legal aspect that would prevent it from entering into negotiations or trade talks with other countries outside the EU bloc during the time it is planning formal exit (Dagnis & Snaith, 2016). Additionally, there is no provision in Article 50 and Article 3(1) of the TFEU that disallows a member who wishes to exit the EU from taking part in trade negotiations with other countries outside the EU as long as no legal obligations are involved. Since trade discussions will under no circumstances translate into international obligations, the UK will be free to negotiate trade deals with other countries including the EU as stipulated in Article 50 (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). The UK is, therefore, free to strike any trade deals with the EU after exiting the bloc as long as appropriate legal channels are followed.
According to Mrs. Cecilia Malmström; the EU trade commissioner, the UK is free to strike traded deals with the EU only after it has exited completely from the bloc. She argues that for a country to strike trade agreements with the European Union, the country must first exit the union and then begin fresh negotiations for any possible considerations. However, her interpretation adheres strictly to the Article 50 of the EU laws. Additionally, her interpretations imply the complexity of the agreement in that the EU and the UK would conflict the EU practices and rules in the negotiations of trade agreements (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). Additionally, she interprets that any form of agreement between the UK and EU would raise eyebrows in terms of conflicts of interest. However, the UK has all the rights to negotiate with the EU in trade deals as it took part in all the decisions that involved the economy of the constituent countries.
Despite exiting the EU, the UK is still a member of the European Union Council, which gives and sets directives pertaining to trade agreements (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). In this regard, it has access to all the confidential information regarding the trade deals with the EU. However, before initiating the trade deal, the UK, and the EU must conclude an official withdrawal agreement while considering the implications of the trade relations between the EU and the member states that opts to withdraw (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). However, it is still not clear what might be included in the framework, but it would be nothing more of the spirit of Article 50. The article envisages an acquisition of instruments that governs the bilateral interrelationship between the EU and the UK. This includes all the technical future aspects that might only be concluded only if the UK has completed its formal exit from the EU (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016).
In summary, regarding the conflict of interest perception, there shouldn’t be any form of insurmountable difficulty or obstacle that will in any way affect the opening of trade negations and deals between the EU and the UK (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). In addition to these facts, Article 50(4) highlights the rules involved in voting should a member opts to quit the EU. The Council can also tackle certain rules regarding the confidential information that arises from the agreement obtained from the guideline in Article 50(2). Finally, even though Article 50 triggers challenging questions pertaining to a law that relates to the probable mechanics and what cannot or can be agreed upon during the withdrawal process, the success of the trade deal will bear great significance when the big political wigs from both sides agree to the terms and conditions of the deal. This is the example involved in all international trade deals, and therefore, the EU and the UK trade deals cannot be an exception. Norway is already involved.
Dagnis Jensen, M., & Snaith, H. (2016). When politics prevails: the political economy of a Brexit. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-9.
Goodwin, M. J., & Heath, O. (2016). The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate‐level Analysis of the Result. The Political Quarterly, 87(3), 323-332.
Howard, P. N., & Kollanyi, B. (2016). Bots,# StrongerIn, and# Brexit: computational propaganda during the UK-EU Referendum. Browser Download This Paper.
Pisani-Ferry, J., Röttgen, N., Sapir, A., Tucker, P., & Wolff, G. B. (2016). Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership. Bruegel External Publication, Brussels.
Weiler, J. H. (2015). Brexit: No Happy Endings; The EJIL Annual Foreword; EJIL on your iPad!!!; Vital Statistics; ICON. S Conference. European journal of international law= Journal europeen de droit international, 26(1), 1-7.